Edo on the Move: Parades and Processions in Early Modern Japan by McNally, Mark
Edo on the Move: Parades and Processions in Early Modern Japan
Mark McNally
Department of History
University of Hawaii at Manoa
 My primary purpose in giving this presentation is to provide brief 
comments on each of the papers of this symposium. I will save some of my 
own observations on the topic for the end, but ask those in attendance 
keep in mind that I am not an expert on parades or processions of any kind, 
let alone those of Tokugawa Japan.

Kurushima

 Professor Kurushima’s paper demonstrates the extent to which the 
parades and processions of Tokugawa Japan can give historians insight 
into different aspects of Tokugawa society, especially attitudes toward those 
involved in the processions themselves. He argues that the presence, in 
the case of Ryūkyū and Korea, or the absence, in the case of the Dutch, of 
chisō 馳走 or “reception,” indicates the ways in which the Edo Bakufu 
viewed its relationships to foreign cultures. Ron Toby argues that the 
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decline of the Ming dynasty in 1644 fueled the development of a Japan-
centered world order, the fundamental structure for which the Japanese 
borrowed from the Chinese, namely, the tributary system. At nearly the 
same time, the custom of sankin-kōtai was taking shape, developing from a 
voluntary display of loyalty to the Shogun to a mandatory one. These 
parallel developments converged in the practices associated with 
processions, as those of foreign envoys bolstered this Japan-centered 
world order and those of the daimyo reinforced the political reality of 
Tokugawa dominance. This convergence also served to elide, in the minds 
of those paying close attention, the Edo Bakufu with Japan, so that the 
processions of foreign envoys were both a display of respect for the Bakufu 
and also for Japan, while sankin-kōtai fostered an image of political and 
even cultural unity. 
 Professor Kurushima observes how the Dutch were treated less well 
than the Koreans and the Ryūkyūans because the Dutch were not viewed 
as guests of the Edo Bakufu. Although the Ryūkyūans were guests, their 
participation in the procession to Edo was not exactly by choice, unlike the 
Koreans. The Dutch were in Japan for purposes of trade, and so they were 
ineligible for chisō despite the fact that they engaged in processions of their 
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own to Edo. Beginning in 1853, the Americans arrived in Japan also with 
trade in mind; following the Treaty of Kanagawa, they had permission to 
trade just like the Dutch, with the exception that they were not required to 
conduct their business in Nagasaki. What impact, if any, did the so-called 
“opening of Japan” have on the practice of processions? Tokugawa 
Iemochi’s procession to Kyoto in 1863 came the year after the 
requirements for sankin-kōtai were relaxed by the Bakufu, so that the 
imperative to proceed fell on the shogun himself, rather than on the 
daimyo. One way to view his procession is to juxtapose its image of power 
and authority against the image of Bakufu weakness that developed in the 
aftermath of the unequal treaties with the West.

Smits

 Professor Smits argues very convincingly for a shift in the Ryūkyūan 
attitude toward China following Satsuma’s invasion in 1609. Under direction 
from Satsuma, and also from the Edo Bakufu, Ryūkyū was required to 
make every effort to maintain its status as a tributary state of the then 
waning Ming dynasty. Although this trade was not as lucrative as the 
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Satsuma and Bakufu leaders had hoped, it was still a vital conduit for 
Chinese trade goods, and it gave the Bakufu access to China in a way that 
circumvented the need for the Bakufu to become a part of the tributary 
system. The Ryūkyūans had to be mindful to hide the true nature of their 
relationship to Satsuma and to the Bakufu, even if these efforts devolved 
into ritualistic farce. At the same time, cultural Sinification was another way 
for the Ryūkyūans to maintain close ties with the Chinese by creating “a 
good impression.” While all of the specific ways that the Ryūkyūans used to 
do this that Professor Smits mentioned in his talk are all valid, it is 
important to remember that the Ryūkyūans wanted to make a good 
impression on the Satsuma officials as well by showing the degree to which 
they had mastered Japanese cultural and artistic forms, such as Ikebana 
and the tea ceremony. Professor Smits likens the ceremonies associated 
with investiture that were undertaken on Okinawa during the visits of 
Chinese investiture officials as a kind of “parade,” in the sense that the 
Ryūkyūans wanted, literally, to put on a good show, a fact to which the 
origins of kumiudui attest. In addition to this functional equivalent of a 
parade, the Ryūkyūan envoys that journeyed to Edo as either keigashi or 
sha’onshi were critical to the success of actual processions, and the 
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impression that they left with the Japanese people was both a lasting and 
positive one.
 Anyone visiting Shuri Castle today cannot avoid the crowds that 
gather around the famous Shureimon gate. The gate itself dates to the 
1530s, and its famous inscription, or hengaku, shurei no kuni, meaning “the 
realm that observes ritual,” a phrase attributed to the Ming emperor Wan Li 
in praise of Ryūkyū, dates to a few decades later during the reign of King 
Shō Ei (r. 1573-1588). In other words, both the gate and its inscription date 
to the period prior to the Satsuma invasion. The hengaku was displayed on 
the gate only during the stay of the Chinese investiture officials; once they 
left, it was taken down. King Shō Shitsu (r. 1648-1668) ordered that the 
hengaku remain on the gate permanently, and thereafter the gate became 
known as the Shureimon. Prior to the Satsuma invasion, the gate and its 
hengaku were displayed by Ryūkyūan kings as a proud accomplishment, in 
recognition of their efforts to adopt Chinese cultural institutions, for the 
consumption of their Chinese guests. After 1609, especially after the 
hengaku was made permanent, it functioned more as a goal both for the 
consumption of their Chinese guests and also for their Japanese overlords. 
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Yokoyama

Professor Yokoyama observes how Japanese commoners of the Edo 
period developed a rather positive image of Ryūkyū via the keigashi and 
sha’onshi processions and their graphic representations, especially those 
that were published. This image of Ryūkyū carried over into the modern 
period, and it was one of the likely factors behind the Meiji state’s 
annexation of Ryūkyū in 1879. During the Edo period, this positive image of 
Ryūkyū developed alongside the adoption and use of Ryūkyūan items by 
the Japanese people in their everyday lives, and the transformation of the 
sanshin into the shamisen might be one of the more prominent examples of 
this. Since the depictions of Ryūkyūan and Korean processions were very 
nearly the same, did a similarly friendly image of Korea develop during the 
Edo period? Did the Tokugawa Japanese adopt and use Korean items as 
they had Ryūkyūan ones? Despite the requirement that the Ryūkyūan 
envoys had to look as foreign as possible, did the people of Tokugawa 
Japan still see the Koreans as somehow more foreign than the 
Ryūkyūans?
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 By drawing on the notions of cultural hierarchy implicit within the 
Chinese tributary system, the Edo Bakufu was able to project an image of 
power and authority by receiving foreign envoys, whether it was the 
Koreans, the Ryūkyūans, or even the Dutch. As Ron Toby has famously 
argued, foreign relations played a critical role in the Edo Bakufu’s efforts to 
prove its political legitimacy, a task that was especially important during the 
early decades of the seventeenth century. Whether the Koreans, the 
Ryūkyūans, or the Dutch were actually impressed by this image, which they 
had a hand in creating, was less important to the Edo Bakufu than the 
effect it had on Tokugawa society as a whole. In other words, the 
processions of foreign envoys functioned ideologically in a way that was 
accessible and comprehensible to anyone who saw them or even heard of 
them. Thus, the fact that the Edo Bakufu had to maintain foreign relations, 
even during an era when it otherwise closed Japan off from the outside 
world, was, in and of itself, insufficient to produce the desired ideological 
effect of political legitimation. Processions were the very embodiment of the 
Edo Bakufu’s foreign relations and the best means of conveying that fact to 
a large swath of the country and to nearly all levels of Tokugawa society.
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 The popular esteem for Ryūkyū, it would seem, was an unintended 
consequence of this ideological performance. Were the leaders of the Edo 
Bakufu at all concerned with the growing fondness among the Tokugawa 
Japanese for Ryūkyūan culture? Did these attitudes somehow facilitate the 
larger ideological message inherent in the processions themselves?

Seifman

Mr. Seifman cautions us against reading too much into the analysis of 
graphic representations of Ryūkyūan processions. Analysis of these 
representations can yield a great deal of information, and Mr. Seifman 
masterfully demonstrated this in his presentation, but we should be aware 
of the limitations inherent in using them as primary sources. He notes how 
the Ryūkyūan envoys were dressed in decidedly foreign garb, but he 
questions the prevailing interpretation among historians that the Ryūkyūans 
were forced by the leaders of Satsuma, perhaps in league with Bakufu 
officials, to do this. He suggests that it was possible that the Ryūkyūans 
themselves had some “agency” in the selection of their clothing, so that 
their Ryūkyūan and/or Chinese appearance may have been more a matter 
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of choice than sartorial imperative. This is the kind of question that even a 
very close analysis of a graphic representation of a Ryūkyūan procession 
cannot begin to address.
 Mr. Seifman astutely pointed out how the use of the kago and the 
horse in Ryūkyūan depictions seem inverted by comparison with their 
sankin-kōtai counterparts. Specifically, the daimyo who proceeded either to 
or from Edo as part of their sankin-kōtai processions preferred to make the 
journey on horseback rather than as a passenger in a kago, as Mr. 
Seifman, citing Constantine Vaporis, argues that travel via the latter was 
not as comfortable as the former. In the case of the Ryūkyūan processions, 
high-ranking officials seem to have traveled via kago, while their lower-
ranking colleagues made the trip on horseback. This situation would seem 
to be the inversion of sankin-kōtai, since the daimyo was almost certainly 
the highest-ranking person in any sankin-kōtai procession, yet horseback 
seemed to have been the transportation mode of choice rather than the 
kago. If this is the case, I would like to offer a potential explanation, namely, 
that the daimyo preference for the horse may have had more to do with 
maintaining the appearance of a proper military leader than it did with 
matters of comfort, and if the two happened to coincide, then all the better. 
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It may have been more difficult to project the requisite image of warrior 
leadership while hidden inside a kago. By the same token, having high-
ranking officials from Ryūkyū on horseback may have projected an overly 
martial image that conflicted with the model of civilian authority then 
prevalent in China, a model that the Ryūkyūans constantly sought to 
emulate. The preference among high-ranking Ryūkyūan officials for the 
kago over the horse may have symbolized the ideal hierarchy of civilian 
authority over military authority, a hierarchy that the Japanese began to 
reverse in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a process that was 
completed far in advance of the seventeenth century.

Szostak

Observations

 I have two general comments to make on the subject of processions 
and early modern Japanese history. The first deals with evolving 
perceptions of foreignness by the Tokugawa Japanese, and the other is 
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related to the ways in which these foreign interactions influenced Tokugawa 
society.
 The word which is universally used to signify “foreign country” is 
gaikoku, and “foreigner” is gaikokujin or, more commonly, gaijin, one of the 
first words those new to the study of Japanese learn. A more literal 
translation of gaikoku would be something like “external realms,” or “realms 
on the outside,” translations which betray Japanese assumptions regarding 
foreignness, namely, that the Western binaries of foreign/domestic or 
foreign/native are different from the analogous Japanese binaries of 
internal/external or inside/outside. Although the usage of gaikoku is so 
ubiquitous in Japan today, the provenance of the term is likely quite 
ancient, when its cognate, totsukuni was used to refer to provinces outside 
of the Kinai region. Similarly, the word tozama was used to refer to daimyo 
during the Muromachi period whose lands fell outside of the provinces 
controlled either directly or indirectly by the Ashikaga, and its utility was 
such that it was adopted by the Tokugawa shoguns to refer to those great 
lords whose power represented any kind of challenge to their own. While a 
binary of center/periphery was certainly at work in the ways in which 
totsukuni was used in Japanese antiquity, this binary functioned in even 
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more robust ways during the Edo period, when all daimyo were required to 
undertake their sankin-kōtai processions to and from Edo. Indeed, the 
power and authority of the Shogun was enhanced in more profound ways 
when one analyzes sankin-kōtai as the practice of manifesting both the 
Shogun’s political centrality as well as his position on the inside, in an 
analogous position to that of the emperor in the Kinai that the concept of 
totsukuni was intended to evoke.
 Citing the work of Bitō Masahide, Ron Toby has argued that the 
decline of the Ming dynasty inspired some Japanese Confucians, notably 
Yamazaki Ansai, Yamaga Sokō, and Asami Keisai, to claim the title of 
Chūka (“central efflorescence”) or Chūgoku (“central realm”) for Japan.   It 1
is the concept of the center inherent in these terms that undergirded the 
Chinese tributary system, and which honed the semiotic effectiveness of 
later Japanese concepts like totsukuni and tozama. In fact, one could argue 
that the sankin-kōtai and foreign envoy processions of the Tokugawa period 
derived their ceremonial and ritual meanings from this Chinese concept of 
the center. The practical experience of Chinese imperial authority, its 
Japanese counterpart, or that of the Tokugawa Shogun began from their 
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   Ronald Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 1
p. 222.
conceptual positions of centrality, which was created and re-created via 
processions of peoples. 
 For Yamaga Sokō, Japan did not simply displace China from the 
center; it was always at the center, despite the fact that no one seemed to 
have been aware of this situation. For Sokō, the proof of this fact was 
fundamentally cosmological and geographical. Writing in 1669, he states,

The earth is in the center of the heavens. The center is [bounded by] the 
four directions, [thus,] it is the center. The Central Realm means the realm 
in the center of Heaven and earth. What does the center of Heaven and 
earth mean? It means that the seasons change [as they should] and there 
are no extremes of cold or heat, and its land and people are both very 
beautiful...There are many realms in the world, but only the Central Realm 
[Japan] and the Outer Imperial Realm [China] are in the center of Heaven 
and earth.  2

In this passage, Sokō uses the name Central Realm to refer to Japan and 
Outer Imperial Realm or gaichō to refer to China, a term that resonates with 
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   Yamaga Sokō, Chūchō jijitsu, in Dai Nihon shisō zenshū, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Dai Nihon Shisō Zenshū 2
Kankōkai, 1933), pp. 80-81.
gaikoku and totsukuni. Citing its geographic position in particular, Sokō 
believed that Japan’s climate and natural environment made it superior to 
China, so that referring to Japan as the Central Realm was naturally fitting 
and appropriate. 
 The significance of Japan’s centrality was of cosmic proportions for 
Sokō. For the Confucians, the concept of the center was foundational for 
both their metaphysical view of the world and their moral teachings which 
grew out of it; it would not be an exaggeration to say that the center made a 
Confucian epistemology possible. Rather than analyze the link between 
Confucian epistemology and a concept of the center, Jacques Derrida has 
examined the ways in which the center makes meaning possible in a 
Western context. He observed how the Western esteem for structural 
thinking, which gave rise in the modern era to Marxism and to 
Structuralism, betrayed a structural character all its own, one that needed a 
concept of the center in order to function:

[S]tructure -- or rather the structurality of structure -- although it has always 
been at work, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a 
process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixed 
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origin. The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and 
organize the structure -- one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized 
structure -- but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the 
structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. By 
orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of the 
structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form. And even 
today the notion of a structure lacking any center represents the 
unthinkable itself.   3

Derrida, of course, did not seek to praise such an epistemology so much as 
indicate how it operated to produce meanings that seemed fixed and 
inviolable, such that the destabilization of meaning could only be 
accomplished via play, specifically, the play of the signifier. However, his 
observations about the center apply equally well to the Confucian concept 
of the center, which was also intended to produce epistemological stability 
and make signification possible. The chief difference between the two 
concepts of center is that the Confucians overtly assigned a series of 
signifieds to the center’s signifier, of which China itself was one. In the 
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   Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and 3
Difference, translated by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 351-352.
Western tradition, there is seemingly no signified for the center; it is 
function without substance. As Derrida pointed out in his writings, a concept 
with no signified, yet from which emerged the unproblematic couplings of 
signifiers and signifieds, was itself a kind of signified that transcended all 
others; it was the transcendental signified. Among the attempts to come to 
grips with the transcendental signified in the Western tradition, Derrida 
observed, was God. Derrida’s identification of logocentrism made the 
connection between the concept of the center and God, while Confucian 
scholars in East Asia had long made the association between the center 
and the cosmos a foundational part of their teachings.
 While the utility of gaikoku in modern parlance is clear, it had to share 
space during the Edo period with another word with a similar meaning yet 
which evoked a different set of binaries, ikoku. The word ikoku can be 
rendered as “different realm” or “exotic realm,” translations which produce 
binaries such as exotic/familiar and different/same. By referring to the 
processions of the Koreans, the Ryūkyūans, and perhaps the Dutch, as 
those of peoples from ikoku, the ideological emphasis on the political 
authority and ritualistic centrality of the Edo Bakufu converged with an 
emerging sense of cultural sameness on the part of those viewing the 
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processions, whether in person or not. In other words, these processions 
had the effect, perhaps unintended, of creating images of nation and ethnie 
at the same time, making the task of distinguishing between the two very 
difficult. In a complementary way, the sankin-kōtai processions reinforced 
these images on nearly a constant basis for more than two hundred years, 
since political centralization was the very raison d'être for sankin-kōtai in 
the first place. Moreover, the residency requirement in Edo for daimyo and 
their families contributed to the awareness of belonging to a common 
ethnie, which the development of an Edo dialect of Japanese facilitated to a 
great degree. 
 The seventeenth-century designation of Korea and Ryūkyū as ikoku, 
and likely the Portuguese and the Spanish in the sixteenth century, 
endured until the end of the Edo period. The utility of ikoku as a general 
designation for foreign countries was such that Sakamoto Ryōma used it to 
refer to the United States in the 1850s and 1860s. In a letter to his father 
which he brushed shortly after the arrival of Matthew Perry and the US 
Navy in 1853, Ryōma refers to the Americans as the people of an ikoku 
several times:
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Concerning my brother’s rumor about America [having arrived in Japan], 
you can judge for yourself. First of all, regarding this urgent matter [before 
us], [though] you may have a hard time with [my] hasty and messy 
handwriting, how can we avoid having to deal with [these] foreign ships? I 
know that, by next spring, the numbers [of foreigners] will have grown...I 
am certain that foreign ships will keep coming [to Japan], [which means] 
that [foreign] armies will soon follow. When that time comes, I will take [me 
some] foreign heads and return home with them.  4

What is significant in Ryōma’s late Tokugawa usage of ikoku was not the 
commonalities he saw between the Americans and the Koreans and the 
Ryūkyūans, but the commonalities he believed existed among the 
Japanese people. While ikoku functioned as a signifier of difference, the 
effect it produced was a signification of cultural sameness.
 My final observation regarding processions is related to the ways in 
which nativism is understood in the field of anthropology. One of the 
seminal works in the area of what I call anthropological nativism is Ralph 
Linton’s 1943 article, “Nativistic Movements.” In this essay, Linton describes 
 18
   Sakamoto Ryōma, letter dated 9/23 of Kaei 6 [1853], reproduced in Sakamoto Ryōma kankei monjo, 4
vol. 1 (Tokyo: Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai, 1921), p. 38.
the arrival of colonizers and their interactions with the natives as 
paradigmatic for the emergence of nativism. In these encounters, the 
culture of the colonizers influences cultural developments among the 
colonized, and the cultural institutions of the colonized have a similar 
influence on the attitudes of the colonizers, and he labels these 
developments and attitudes as comprising nativism.   In the case of 5
processions, we see a similar interaction between foreigner arrivals and the 
natives, with the exception that the former are not bent on the colonization 
of the latter. In fact, the power dynamic is reversed between the context of 
these foreigner envoy processions and the case of nativism, as Linton’s 
colonial paradigm operates on the assumption that the foreigner arrivals 
have more technological and military prowess than the natives do, while 
this was certainly not the case with the foreigner envoy processions of the 
Tokugawa period. 
 Rather than argue that these processions represented instances 
within which nativistic attitudes emerged among the Japanese, I believe 
that the images of authority and paternalism which they evoked, one at the 
behest of the Edo Bakufu and the other among the commoners who viewed 
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them, were different aspects of the same phenomenon, namely, 
exceptionalism. As one Americanist has observed, exceptionalism is a way 
of thinking based on ideas of either a nation’s “exempt” status or its 
“exemplary” status.   A nation is exceptional when it is exempt from forces 6
that otherwise affect all other nations; it is also exceptional when it is 
qualitatively exemplary in ways that other nations are not, in other words, 
superior. It is easier to make a case for exceptionality when one’s nation is 
the recipient of foreign processions and exempt from having to undertake 
them, and this was the case with China and its tributary states, of which 
Ryūkyū was one. By not submitting to this tributary system, the Edo Bakufu 
was able to foster an image of itself and of Japan as exceptional by virtue 
of an exemption from the Chinese tributary system. At the same time, the 
very reasons for undertaking the journeys to pay homage either to the 
Chinese emperor or to the shogun could be construed as a recognition of 
that nation’s cultural superiority, an observation that Toby made regarding 
the Edo Bakufu’s need to maintain at least some level of foreign relations 
with the outside world. Consequently, rather than fostering one type of 
exceptionalism over the other, these foreigner envoy processions derived 
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1800 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), p. 201.
their ideological power from both. Much the same could be said for China 
and its tributary system, such that Japanese exceptionalism during the 
Tokugawa period must be examined alongside China’s. One could say that 
the strength of Japanese efforts to prove Japan’s exceptionality was likely 
inversely proportional to that of the Chinese, and this could be a reason 
why these foreigner envoy processions were as prominent as they were 
during the Tokugawa period.     
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